grondilu (OP)
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October 04, 2010, 10:37:19 AM Last edit: October 04, 2010, 12:13:02 PM by grondilu |
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An interesting aspect of information market is that it is, as far as I know, the only market where both transfers are, thanks to bitcoins, irrevocables and decentralized.
I mean : when you buy a piece of information, say a 32Ko block, you exchange pure information against bitcoin. Both transfer doesn't imply the use of a trust party in any way, at least if you don't require compensation. It's really a pure exchange model, from a technical point of view.
Therefore I think implementing a P2P information market software can be an interesting experimentation.
If I were to suggest a technique to do so, I would say that a P2P decentralized adjudication and compensation system would be installed, inspired from the bitcoin model. Each bid and ask for a given hash would be broadcasted globally on the network, and a node would be allowed to perform both adjudication/compensation automatically after some proof of work of increasing difficulty. The unpredictable location of this node would ensure honnesty of adjudication/compensation. At least as long as the honnests nodes are majoritary, like in the bitcoin model.
Let me give an example.
Say Alice is a node in the network, and wants to buy the 32Ko block whose hash is HHH. She lets every nodes in the network know what she wants (she broadcasts a bid). Bob has HHH, and in response, he broadcast a ask for this block. After some time, all nodes will have their own copies of a global orders book stored in their memory. According to the protocol, nothing happens until a node, say the one that belongs to Claire, performs a certain proof-of-work on this book order. Then Claire does the adjudication of the book order, and publishes her results, resulting in the possibility of the exchange between Alice and Bob. Alice then send bitcoins to Claire, and Bob sends the block to Claire. Claire, then, sends block to Alice, and bitcoins to Bob, thus performing compensation.
Anyway, I think the information market problem is a interesting one, from a theoretical point of view.
There would be many ways to implement it, imo. Only one would be perfect, and we should keep looking for it. For instance, the above proposal would suffer several problems. One is that nothing is done to prevent dumb nodes to have the whole network waste time. Indeed, a node might very well *try* to steal some bitcoins by pretending it has pretty much all hashes, although it actually has nothing. The network would realize the scam and avoid it only at compensation level, thus wasting a lot of resource and time. It could halt the whole network. Thus, a trust system should be implemented, in order to avoid nodes that try to publish rubbish. The economics algorithm of GNUnet would do the job, I guess.
An other idea : in a "do one thing, but do it well" philosophy, adjudication and compensation should be separated. In our example, this would mean that Claire would only be in charge of adjudication. She would process the order book and produce a "request for compensation". Such a request would then be broadcasted in the network, and an other proof-of-work would be required on it before the compensation could be performed by an other node, say Daniel.
Both Claire and Daniel, seen respectively as a Adjudicator and a compensator, would be judged in the trust GNUnet model by Alice and Bob for their respectives roles, so that they can be avoided later if they don't do their job properly.
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