Besides, as far as I know, tonych can't do anything if economy decide to change some witness [..]
I guess, this puts me in the "mindless cheerleaders" category then
.
Let me quote the most well informed person:
You are correct, if 12 witnesses so decide, they can block all attempts to replace them. But this is exactly what they were expected not to do when they were added themselves. If a minority of witnesses appears untrustworthy, they can be promptly replaced before they reach majority.
I discuss in the whitepaper a mechanism which helps make the behavior of witnesses more predictable and earlier detect any breaches of trust: a would-be witness pledges to follow the witness lists of a few (possibly larger than 12) prominent industry leaders. The pledge is not enforceable in the protocol but publicly auditable, any breach of the pledge would immediately make the witness a candidate for removal.
To be fair, and in retrospect, I probably misunderstood that you were not concerned discussing byteball centralization generically and in theory, as a quality, but in particular, as it manifest itself at the current situation and stage of the project, with the real people involved, as I think I understand now, and for that I appologize.
As for the general/theoretical situation of collusion of most witnesses and how impotent the rogue cartel would be against an economy that value its platform a lot, please see pages 21/22 of white paper by the same author (not cited here for brevity) about how to deal with them (schism).
Still to be seen how easy/hard collusion of majority witnesses could form, mechanisms of changing witnesses, schism, would be coordinated etc, keeping in mind all incentives (economical, reputational etc) involved.
Yes, indeed. I would add ignorant to this and it's not funny.
That was easy as per my own admission there.
