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    Author Topic: CoinJoin: Bitcoin privacy for the real world  (Read 294761 times)
    laurentmt
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    June 10, 2014, 03:48:25 PM
     #541

    Peter Todd has made an interesting statement in the comments of this coindesk's article.

    Quote
    What Dark Wallet actually implements is to have two classes of users, those who need a transaction done immediately, and those who are mixing coins. The latter group simply copies the output amounts of the former group, providing a set of two outputs in every CoinJoin transaction whose ownership is unknown. SharedCoin does the same thing, but with blockchain.info acting as that coin mixing group.

    I may be wrong but it seems likely that bc.i uses a same pool of coins over and over for the sharedcoin txs. It's not impossible that, with some efforts, someone could identify which txos in the transaction graph are concerned (i.e. belong to bc.i), decreasing a bit more the level of privacy offered. To be effective and avoid this kind of privacy leak, coinjoin should use a large pool of mixing coins (the 2nd group of users in Peter's comment) and avoid reusing the same mixing coins over and over (with a frequency which allows to identify them).

    Btw, it's likely that decentralized solutions like darkwallet are the easiest way to achieve this goal if they have enough traction and can maintain a large mixing pool.
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