Now you raised the level of your dialogue and logic to something worth discussing. Thanks.
My point is that you have to actually show how a rise of a single cartel can happen in the first place. You have not shown this.
History has shown this. Yet you are correct I can not prove that cartels will or won't continue to occur as they have throughout history.
Historicly, cartels rise as a form of regulatory capture. Said another way, cartels form functional monopolies in a regulated industry, within a country, because governments exist. What influence any particular govenrment, or all of them together (unlikley), can have upon the bitcoin economy remains to be seen. However, it cannot rationally be assumed that cartels will rise in an unregulated environment. They never have before today.
And before you start spouting about Railroad Robber Barons or Standard Oil; the railroads were a government project from the start and Standard Oil was no more of a monopoly than Microsoft was during the 1990's. They were simply market dominators who had not yet been out innovated by new competitors.
Thus you can't prove they won't either.
It is a stalemate, but I have history of my side.
I could prove it, with great effort, but (once again) I don't need to do any such thing. It's your theory. In the long run, you could make a fortune betting your side of the theory if you are correct. I'll stick with my side, and we will see who goes broke first.
Normally the market will take advantage of any profit opportunity if it is overall more efficient. So your job if you want to prove it won't happen, is to prove it won't be overall more efficient. This is probably impossible to prove one way or the other since there are too many potential exogenous factors.
You just talked yourself into a circle. I can easily prove that a mining cartel cannot be the most efficient. I can prove it with existing examples, and have literally done this more than once over the past three years with nearly identical claims of cartel/monopoly based theories. The key you're missing is that the protocol doesn't
require that miners be paid within the system itself, or even at all. Fee less transactions exist, and they can be paid for out-of-network. Beyond that, off-network transactions are not only possible, they already occur quite regularly; even if they remain a small minority of the total economy. On-network transactions are the high-mark of trustless security, but Satoshi undrstood that not everyone would really require such a high degree of security, nor trustless interactions. In fact, he was counting on parrallel networks (such as Stratum) to develop without his own help that would handle less perfect transactions among parties that trust one another well enough, and thus remove a significant amount of network traffic from the main bitcoin network. By the time your attack could even be tested, the majority of transactions wouldn't even be using the bitcoin network at all, and the main network would be more akin to the ATM network banks use today. More of a backbone of the most risky or sensitive international transactions than what Joe Six Pack uses to order an ebook for his kindle.
I have history of my side as to the real risk of this attack. I also know the government and banks feel threatened by bitcoin (or at least feign concern, if they realize they can take it over). So there is a lot of motivation to make a cartel.
Motivation alone is not enough. There also must be a credible regulatory path. I don't see one. If there is one, than government regulation is a greater risk than the rise of a single mining cartel.
As I have already pointed out, the rise of competing cartels was expected, and planned for, from the early days.
Not my attack. It was never discussed. I've read everything from the early days with Satoshi. They assumed the corporations would be benign.
Dude, that's not even possible. Reading all of that, I mean.
Simply saying that Amazon can control the transactions within it's own payment system is one thing, but saying that they can progressively take over all mining by this does not follow. There are simply too many counter incentives to presume this.
Sorry but the logic is clear. If they can withhold a percentage of funding from the network, they gain a parasitic and spiraling advantage over the network hashrate power.
I might be clear to you, but you don't understand the system yet. Amazon
can't withhold funding from the network. They can only delay processing of their own transactions. Time is definately money, and there is a hidden cost to Amazon to do this under any conditions. They also open themselves up to a double spend attack if they do this in any significant capacity, and someone is going to use that against them eventually. If you think that Amazon holding their own transactions so that other miners can't get their transaction fees is a problem, why not just issue fee-less transactions? The fees would just be going back to Amazon otherwise. You have not discovered something new here, AnonyMint. Just because Amazon might refuse to pay other miners a mining fee, doesn't mean that they are denying funding for the network. Other miners are just as able to ignore Amazon's transactions, and just as able to refuse to forward transactions to them. In fact, I'm fairly sure that games like this already occur. I'd be surprised to discover that no miners refuse to process free transactions, except for those who are on some kind of whitelist. Miner favoritism is expected, but in the aggregate, has zero effect upon the network as a whole. On the aggregate, the network is, and will remain, impartial towards fee paying transactions. And fee-less transactions are expected to be ignored by a large portion of the professional mining class. Why would it be any other way?
The only way to argue against this is to explain how someone can afford to lose money on mining. Two or more competing cartels? Still not a good outcome.
I've already explained two conditions wherein miners can literally "afford" to lose money on mining. You didn't even bother to respond to them.
Two or more competing cartels is an outcome that functionally prohibits the complete takeover of the currency, which was the endgame of your attack theory. I can't think of one reason that a consumer should care about any cartels, if the currency continues to function as far as he is concerned. Cartels aren't the risk, a monopoly is the risk, and that is impossible.
P.S. Besides any one who has been to amazon.com knows that amazon.com processes the payment for the order, not the vendors. But that isn't necessary to make my point above. Maybe he is thinking instead of Amazon payments, not Amazon vendors.
Anyone who deals with online vending knows that Amazon's payment system is preferred by vendors because it's cheap and effective, but it's not the only way these same vendors sell products. Almost all of them have their own websites, and can take payments outside of the Amazon ecosystem. If Amazon were to turn hostile to those vendor's own interests, it's relatively easy for those vendors to abandon Amazon. The same is true with any aggragate commerce site.
It is not easy for them to turn away. They get an ever increasing percentage of their sales from Amazon, because it is more efficient for both the customer and the vendor.
What do you think they will do if it's no longer efficient? Do you think they will just sit back and take it? Or do you think that they will contrive to come up with other solutions, with or without Amazon's explict permission?
And many vendors are ready to take the place of those who leave.
So?
Efficiency is always the reasons cartels win. This is how Rockfeller justified what he did with Standard Oil, including all the dirty tricks. He said he detested waste.
Ha! I knew we'd get here eventually.
Again, Standard Oil was not a monopoly, or even a cartel. Standard Oil was a temporary market dominator, and could only remain such as long as it was the most efficient provider of services. As for the dirty tricks, Microsoft, Coca-Cola and Ford have all been caught playing dirty trying to maintain a dominate market position that would eventually fall anyway. No one still considers Coca-Cola to be a monopoly on soft drinks, if they ever did. I don't know anyone who still buys the meme that Microsoft is, or ever really was, a monopoly for operating system software.