Ohh noo. No java applet, please.

I could imagine that this is implemented in JavaScript. But then you rely on the server, sending you the JS.

So, where is the trust? You need to trust your browser vendor, you need to trust the server that sends you the JS, you need to trust your browser plugins/addons, you need to trust your OS, you hardware, etc. etc.

+1

Oh, i though that is ready already. Well then this is on hold anyway.

Another great day for nxt!

Don't know where to add a request. Maybe somebody could help on that?

Abuelau, ChuckOne, you should really read this:

https://blockchain.info/wallet/technical-faq

and pay attention to TwinWinNerD. If you can't sign transactions offline (that is without transmitting private keys to anyone), you can't build a secure web wallet. Period.

The way to do this in the browser is via JS a-la blockchain.info.

We should be in 1st place in a little bit.

If one computer is hacked than ONE person loses money.

If your server is compromised, he gets access to every wallet that logs in....

If you decide to collect the passwords and go rouge ....

The argument is extremely simple...

Read this: http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/5249/how-secure-is-blockchain-info

It has nothing to do with TRUSTLESS as it is promoted.

As I already pointed out:

In the end, you have to trust somebody.

I know what you mean, but it is not really trustless.

Blockchain.info is as trustless as possible.

""""""""
Server Side

    The site currently runs on 4 dedicated servers, hosted in a locked cabinet. All servers run behind a dedicated cisco security appliance with intrusion detection. On the servers themselves various "booby traps" are set to alert the webmaster if an intrusion is detected.

    The java code deployed to the Site is deployed in a single war (zip) file. Each server monitors the checksum of this file to detect any unauthorised changes to the code. In order to make reverse engineering our encryption schemes more difficult the the java class files are obfuscated using proguard.

    A copy of every wallet is stored all our servers. Additionally the latest 50 versions of a wallet are stored on Amazon S3 and can be restored from the [Import Export] section.

    The server side code that handles wallets is open source.

    The site is not vulnerable to CSRF requests as no login details or sensitive data is ever saved in session cookies.

    In the time the Site has been running there has been handful of XSS vulnerabilities reported. None of these were on a wallet page and could not have resulted in any direct loss of funds.
"""""""""