I understood you , I just wanted to show it in numbers. Such an attack would be more difficult to organize about 30,000 times. And that's not counting the fact that Bitcoin has different address formats.

If I understand Dave's somewhat obtuse comment correctly, it would appear that his eyesight is failing him

@DaveF, if it makes you feel any better... I'm probably not far off needing to do the same!

I would be wary of doing this for a couple of reasons. Clipboard malware could obviously change the address, but so could anything malicious on your email provider's servers. It's also a privacy risk, since your email provider will likely have copies of the draft email you create saved and linked to your account even after you've deleted the address. I would prefer to use QR codes or a USB drive, same as I would use for moving transactions back and forth to an airgapped device.

The same probably applies to passphrases. Given how often users reuse the same password across all their accounts, I bet there are a significant number of people who are using their computer password or various account passwords as the passphrase for their seed extensions.

I use USB webcams with my computers when transferring QR codes. I've physically removed the built in webcam from my laptop, but I have a couple of super cheap webcams (like, $10 each) which I will plug in for the sole purpose of scanning a QR code and then immediately unplug again. I use a different webcam specific for each computer. It's a great set up that practically removes the possibility of leaking information or transferring malware between devices accidentally. If you want to be super paranoid, another nice trick I've picked up along the way is after I generate a QR code with one computer, I'll scan it with the webcam attached to that same computer and ensure that it scans and decodes to the correct information before I then scan it with the webcam attached to the second computer.

What I'd really like is a USB drive with maybe 300 bytes of memory only, so you could still transfer small transactions but too small for any crypto stealing malware. Maybe I'll build my own someday.

To be fair, if the hardware wallet is used the same way as a paper wallet (just for receiving, stored in a safe place and coins are not spent) it's only susceptible to the supply chain attack that e.g. somehow the seed words were predetermined so the manufacturer can steal the funds.

The other attack vectors only come into play when trying to spend the funds, which is simply not possible with a paper wallet without importing it into a software, so it's hard to compare the attack surfaces.
On paper () the paper wallet has less, but in practice, it has more, because once people will want to spend that balance, they'll probably import it onto a live PC which might be fully infected with malware.

I didn't post for some time on this topics and I didn't really talk about best ways to protect against most of this attacks, but I decided to do it now.
Best protection from Wrench attack (it was $5 before inflation), chosen nonce attack, supply chain attack, evil made attack, pwned hardware wallet and lost seed, is using good Multisig Setup.
Having airgapped open source hardware wallet in combination with multisig setup is providing reasonably good protection from most attacks, and to be extra secure I would generate seed words offline and not in single hardware wallet.
This is not perfect protection against all attacks, but it is good enough for most people.

While I agree with all the other categories of attack, I'm not sure multi-sig does a particularly good job against $5 $10 wrench attacks.

An attacker will keep hitting you until you give him some coins. He doesn't care if your coins are protected by one signature or several or if they are in a software wallet or a hardware wallet. He will just hit you until you give him coins. The protection against this attack comes from either not revealing that you own any coins at all, or having decoy wallets you can hand over while keeping your main stash hidden. Multi-sig does not lend itself particularly well to this, since the compromise of one seed phrase back up which will most likely have additional xpubs stored along with it reveals the presence of a wallet which the attacker will want access to. Passphrases are a better option here, or entirely dummy wallets as DaveF says.

There is of course nothing stopping you combining multi-sig with a passphrase. Your three seed phrases (or whatever number you choose) generate a multi-sig wallet with a decoy amount of coins in it, while your three seed phrases plus one or more additional passphrases generate a different multi-sig wallet with your real stash hidden away.

It does very good job comparing all other options, except maybe owning a gun and using it against wrench attacker.
Multisig setup can also be good or bad, if you distribute it in different locations with multiple people, it will be very hard for attacker to get anything from you, except decoys.
Jameson Lopp was attacked like this in past, and guess what his defense is now - multisig setup.

I haven't read all of it, but most of it and all these attacks relied on physical access.
They could make your computer transmit data through memory chips, keyboard LEDs, screen changing brightness, stealing and freezing memory chips, and so on. After reading it, I don't feel discouraged from using an air-gapped computer. If I ever face people who can break into my house without leaving a trace and modify my computer so that it starts sending data into a mobile phone network, I'm fucked anyway. They could as well drill a hole in the ceiling and place a micro camera that looks at my screen and keyboard. They wouldn't need to put a 100k USD worth of stuff into my PC to turn my RAM sticks into wifi antennas.


I once saw an interview with a weed grower and he said that every person that knows about you doing it doubles your chances of getting caught. It's the same with owning bitcoin, the more people know about it, the more shit can come your way.

It's important to have safety layers that work with each other, as each layer adds security to the whole system. For instance, I live in a house where there's only one access road and both my neighbors have cameras pointed at that road. That's already a security layer. There's no way to get close enough to my house to access my wifi network without me knowing it, unless you're my neighbor. The house is big and a hardware wallet is very small. Even if someone somehow came looking for it, it would literally take him days to find it. As for the wrench, I chop firewood, he comes with a wrench, I've got an axe