The longer the passphrase with combinations of different characters, the harder it would become to brute force.
But do thieves have the systematic idea of bruteforcing the wallet? With passphrases that are too complicated, we risk not being able to access them ourselves, don't we?
They might know in theory how to do it but with a 24 word seed phrase the
permutations are so vast its deemed impossible.
The seed phrase is there in case you leave your wallet on your table, a thief
breaks in and steals it - its virtually useless to them without either the seed or
the password. The password is for you to access the wallet on a day-to-day basis
rather than entering 24 words every time.
But then what's the point of a long passphrase, since nobody's supposed to know there's one?
Regardless whether someone knows or not if there is a passphrase, they could suspect and try to guess it anyway. The point of having a long passphrase is that even though someone tries to access your wallet through brute force, they would not be able to.
If the 12 or 24 main words constitute a fake wallet, how much should be left in it? I suppose it depends on the standard of living in different countries? And how much would you leave in your fake wallet?
I would not want to put so much obviously but putting too little can fool nobody either. So finding a good balance between what I can afford to lose that can be used as a deception to hackers is the key.
Thats a good point about creating a second wallet with a nominal amount of
funds on it. Depending on your real BTC amount I would say around $500
on the fake wallet, I think a thief would be delighted to walk away with that
amount...if they can access the funds but it doesnt matter because they are gone.