So again, for this vulnerability you need to
- load a wallet from an archive by accident
- have the same special wallet you use
- run into malicious nodes that harvest that data
- use an IP that allows them to identify you...
And now the malicious person knows that individual A, living in south-east Paris, has had Bitcoins in his wallet a decade ago...
I don't understand what you mean with the second point (have the same special wallet). Perhaps that you continue to use the same software? That is quite common in the case of wallets like Electrum/Sparrow.
But point 3 is actually very realistic, as Cricktor already assumed. The point is mentioned in several privacy guides for Bitcoin, for example this one that was updated recently:
https://www.learnbitcoin.com/rabbit-hole/bitcoin-privacy . There are public wallet explorers like the Chainalysis site walletexplorer.com, where (if you're unlucky) your wallet will be shown with the "secondary addresses". The old coins wouldn't be shown, but a malicious or simply curious person will have something to explore if they want.
Point 4 (IP that allows them to identify you) is also a trap you can run very fast into: simply open one recent wallet after the old wallet, or both at the same time. Even if using Tor this can "leak" the information that both wallets were opened on the same device, and Tor used the same connection ...
I agree however a bit with you, for most people the case of a robbery should be a minor problem, it is very unlikely because of that. But think about people living in authoritarian countries (Russia for example) who want to leave as little traces as possible in the Internet, also about their cryptocurrency usage. Or whatever reason you may have, not only as a criminal

. For example, you may not want to mix KYCed and non-KYCed coins -- and the old wallet could just be the connection for the chain analysis guys to complete your puzzle, because you had worse privacy practices back then (very likely!). Or you're somewhat publicly exposed and don't want anybody to know that you're owning Bitcoins since 2012.
It is generally seen as best practice to try to keep wallets separate as much as possible.
PS: Ah, and I meant "target" in the sense that you're a target of chain analysis, or everybody who could be interested in your wallet, for whatever reason. This was not specific about thieves.