Thank you for the info and the update. All best!

I've opened a dedicated thread in Technical Discussion for this purpose.

0.8.6 is only vulnerable if you use the -rpcssl options and expose RPC to the internet - which is vulnerable to other attacks even with this fixed.
So probably not.

On Linux Mint 14 you can still launch your bitcoin-qt if you go to terminal and type "./bitcoin-qt". If you want to start it without having it tied to your terminal window then type "(./bitcoin-qt -min &>dev/null &)"

It's easy to cry "I told you so" in retrospect. But there could have been an exploit in any of the other dependencies. Or in the Bitcoin P2P or RPC network code itself. By no means is OpenSSL the only software that has bugs.

The only long-term sustainable solution to key theft would be to isolate the private keys and signing from the wallet in either a separate process, a trusted computing module or even a seperate device (in order of increased security).

Grate. About 2 hours before this showed up I lost 1,6 something BTC to this... And it took only about 2 hours of running application... So it is not that impossible... Well I think it was this since I have no clue what else could it be... Is there any trace left so I can be sure?

0.9 introduced a bunch of bullshit. How the hell can bitcoin magnet link be vulnerable?! If they continue introducing unwanted bullshit features, bloating the bitcoin official client then bitcoin will be dead for me. This has already gone too far. The protocol specifies flawless security (except quantum computing vulnerability). WHY on earth has this flawless security be ruined by eager developers adding features that are not essential to bitcoin protocol?

+1

Funny... you posted this.. while I was still typing my reply.

Right, in principle, wallet functionality isn't needed at all to maintain the Bitcoin P2P network, the reason for Bitcoin Core's existence.

This is why --disable-wallet mode was introduced in 0.9.0. It allows you to build without the wallet, which removes quite a few dependencies (OpenSSL however is still required as we also use it for ECDSA at this point, and for RPC SSL support, but this could change after merging sipa's ECDSA library).

In the long run there are two options: either we remove the wallet, or we keep it and try to keep up with features of other wallets. Keeping up includes the payment protocol. If payment protocol was not supported people would be complaining about lack of support for the new merchant integration methods.

Dang it! I was sitting here trying to memorize private keys!