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    Author Topic: Suspect #1: Linode admins/insiders  (Read 4795 times)
    lonelyminer (Peter Šurda)
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    March 02, 2012, 02:10:38 PM
    Last edit: March 02, 2012, 02:26:47 PM by lonelyminer
     #21

    That's interesting... so, if I got this right, the password reset requires information an outside attacker should not have? I don't know how Linode handles administration, but that sounds quite important.
    Well, it does not necessarily mean that they shouldn't have had the information they had. If control panel was crap, or the privileges of the compromised account were too high, this could have been sufficient. My point is that either way, incompetence or fraud, it's a major screwup.
    EDIT
    Let me try to explain again. The attackers had a lot of information. This wasn't a script kiddie, it was carefully designed and swiftly and accurately executed. Of course, this does not imply the assistance of Linode employees or contractors. But this only shifts the nature of Linodes failure, it does not really lessen the magnitude.
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