The way in which the operator of TORwallet has partially compromised his identity confirms for me this entire approach is wrong; it's a mistake to trust a third party to protect your anonymity. Even when the owners of a mixing service have the best intentions they can make mistakes and if they can be located they can be threatened.
I don't know enough about cryptography to say how (or if) it can be accomplished but mixing coins needs to be done in a way in such a way that it's not necessary to trust the mixing service.
If your security/anonymity needs are that high, Bitcoin may not be the right thing for you.
You always leave a trail while aquiring bitcoin. Your IP will always be there at some point (if you don't trust TOR). The closest thing would be mining over TOR or something like this.
In short, Bitcoin is well known to be pseudonymous, so you might instead use a centrally managed system (only one instance to trust) or better yet, some offline commodity (where you trust your partner). No free lunch once you become paranoid enough ;-)
I still say TORWallet comes close to the most trustworthy tumbler, in terms of anonymity (not in terms of "noone runs away with your coins" necessarily though). Which doesnt say you shouldn't cascade several services and tumblers.
Ente
This is not always true... there are ways to take precautions if one so desires. There is a reason BTC is used on the black market.
I, personally, feel secure enough with my way of handling bitcoin for the things I do with them. Which involves trusting various companies, services, exchanges and so on.
What I tried to say, is, you will quickly find limits in the usefulness of Bitcoin when you don't trust absolutely nobody..
Which, as a mind experiment, I enjoy, but not for (my) real-world applications.
Once you start calculating risks, thus accepting risks, things become much more reasonable. Like trusting the integrity of the TOR network, for example.
Ente
