I will elaborate on the idea against nxt.
But that link you sent regarding PPC is not about practical impossibility of N@S. It's only about practical impossiblity of the particular attack that the writer describes. This was proven by my attack on APEX. Also, it has some flaws:
is wrong, if you mine your chain in private and publish it only when it has accumulated more work than the main chain then you can attempt this after every block.
is also wrong: 1% gives you about 20% chance of a block. 5% guarantees success.

Absolutely nothing. Looks like NAS is very dead.

Er...I think Kushti may be getting a little bit ahead of himself here.
If you can pull off a successful attack on NXT, or an attack that works in Kushtis simulations, there will be lots of love for ya....possibly even parades!
And definitely some bounty, if you can also produce good quality documentation on the attack.  (Doesn't have to be real WP standard, but that would be up to our devs to judge.)

But: right now, we don't have a formal bounty offer already open.

I just had a thought: maybe you could run an attack on the NXT Testnet ?
Shouldn't be any problem giving you a stake of TestNXT to play with........

If you're up for it, head on over to NXTworld:
https://nxtforum.org/index.php
and we can discuss further......

Those posts make no sense. It's not an attack, but mere market manipulation. If you can just get 51% of a currency by repeatedly FUDding, then you're golden anyways.
From then on it's not N@S at all - because you earned 51%. It's a 51%@Stake attack. You're harming yourself.

No. The point is that the attacker also has a much larger short position in the currency. So while the attacker looses on the stake this is more than offset by the gains on the short position.

I will formulate the attack: The "Second Pirate Savings and Trust" attack on Proof-of-Stake

1. The attacker creates the "Second Pirate Savings and Trust" modelled after the "First Pirate Savings and Trust" later called "Bitcoin Savings and Trust" https://bt.irlbtc.com/view/50822.msg605957#msg605957. This is done in a falling market.
2. The "trust" offers a very attractive rate of interest payable in the POS coin. This rate is significantly higher than the stake rate
3. The "trust" allows investors to leave the interest in the "trust" and roll over the investment.
4. The "trust specifically disclaims that it is a HYIP Ponzi scam https://bt.irlbtc.com/view/50822.msg605981#msg605981
5. The attacker sells a portion of the borrowed POS coin say 50% for XBT, another POW alt-coin, one or more fiat currencies etc. This will becomes the attackers profit at the end. This will also depress the price by short selling creating the "bear raid"
6. A portion of the received POS coins is used to repay interest to those investors that do not reinvest their interest. This is the "ponzi" component; however see below.
7. The rest of the borrowed POS coin is kept by the attacker, accumulated and staked.

At this point this is no different from any bear raid on a stock, fiat currency POW currency etc. If the market exchange rate falls faster than 2x the interest rate less the stake rate then in the 50% example above, the attacker is actually in the black and there is no ponzi. In the normal bear raid the attacker, if the attacker can depress the price enough and cover the short, can actually walk away with a profit. The problem with the simple bear raid is that in covering the short the exchange rate can rise sharply. This converts the bear raid into a ponzi and the scheme collapses in a rising market. This is what happened to "First Pirate Savings and Trust". It collapsed during a rise in the Bitcoin price.

It is at this point where the specific to Proof-of-Stake part of the attack comes into play.

8. The attacker continues the ponzi until he has accumulated enough stake to launch a network attack.
9. The attacker is also accumulating a greater debt in the POS coin and can even continue selling 50% of the borrowed coin to increase his profit.
10. The attacker launches the attack on the coin causing its value to fall to zero. This wipes out the attacker's stake, but more importantly also wipes out the attacker's debt. The specifics of the attack will of course depend on the particular POS coin.
11. The attacker is left with is profit in some other currency, a worthless amount of the POS coin and a debt denominated in the now worthless POS currency.

Countermeasure:
The only known countermeasure is the intervention of the state.  http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539730583#.VLncGTVVIWw.

The challenge here is to devise a countermeasure to this attack that does not involve the involvement of the state or some other centralized authority for example a corporation.

Edit: The network attack can be any attack on a POS coin that requires the attacker to have stake.

Sure the price of Bitcoin has gone down by 80% over the last year and the difficulty has gone up. https://blockchain.info/charts/difficulty. In my attack there is no additional purchase required, and is based on a scenario that has already happened.

You don't understand your own text. I give up man.

Please keep in mind that kushti only used his own simulation model.
I'm very interested to see real world tries on the  Nxt testnet. I imagine that the attack is more complex there because network topology and latency, behaviour of peers,  etc.

I highlighted the key word for you.
Yes, if you're simply already owning a stake of a size that never existed in NXT - and you additionally simply scam yourself into 41% more - and then simply buy 100% of all that value in shorts, and then simply gain another 30% so you cover your costs. Then you can attack.
Why did no one think of that before?


Clearly there is zero gambling in your perfect scheme.


You gotta be kidding me. Nothing of your scenario has anything to do with any of those articles - and yes, I've read them before.
Clearly you didn't because you still don't even know what the term "nothing" means.

Does stupidity really know no limits?



Yes, and in not a single word you said you ever talked about N@S. All the links you provided actually conclude specifically that N@S does not exist, or is not realistically executable.