How about first we make a comprehension and simple to understand guid on how to secure your own bitcoins.

I think some actually accredited security professionals should produce said guide.

no, i think WE need to produce what we can of it, and then let security professionals audit that. otherwise it is never going to get done.

The truth is "bitcoin apps" are not the problem.

The problem is improper security handling. Take the Linode hack for example. Bitcoinica and several other bitcoin related sites had bitcoins stolen. There wasn't a specific "bug" that left these apps vulnerable. The Linode hack was probably an inside job by someone at Linode.

There was ONE poster with Linode however that said wasn't affected because he didn't store funds on a server controlled by someone else.

The problem here is not app security, it's lacking proper forethought.

Another example from this latest breach:


ALL passwords should have been changed. Even basic security 101 says change your password ever so often, even without any breach, ESPECIALLY if funds are related to it.

The problem is high value funds being left vulnerable by people who don't take adequate security care and forethought.

BitcoinArmory.com is an example of GREAT security forethought, and is probably the safest way to cold store bitcoins in existence.

This isn't a bitcoin specific problem.  Many books have been written on how to secure a web server.  I'm not sure if a universal guide would be useful.  Different architectures require different security measures. 

What would be nice is a preconfigured server optimized for bitcoin security and privacy.  Something like  tails except designed for running a simple bitcoin web app. 

The barriers to entry need to be lower.  Developing bitcoin-accepting websites shouldn't be an exclusive privilege of security experts.

How would that have helped this latest Mt.Gox password incompetence, or the earlier Linode (likely inside job) hack?

Okay, but RULE 1 of the guide is that you are only as secure as your weakest link.

Bitcoinica Hack #1 Linode = probably an inside job at Linode

Bitcoinca Hack #2 = Moved to Rackspace; Patrick's email server was compromised, oops!

Bitcoinca Mt.Gox Hack =  We didn't change a password Tihan re-used, sorry!

Edit: I should change the word "hack" above because no hacking was even required. Thieves without computer knowledge could have executed all of the above thefts.

i think it is also important to have a chapter/section about your personal security habits as a developer, and why one hole in the security chain causes the whole thing to crumble (again, anecdotes would be a Good Thing).

is anyone actually going to make this? i think we need it. i would do it myself if i felt technically competent enough (and i really don't).

i wonder if it would be possible to 'hide' the hot wallet server by putting it on its own box, and only allowing tor hidden service connections in.

that way, the IP at least would never be known...

high tech is not the solution to the problems in your previous emails, but my comment was a bit of a sidetrack (that i wish to drop from this thread after this point is made):

i was strictly talking about an idea of how to hide a hot wallet server, disconnected from your previous points. the above, provided some basic precaution on part of the developer, would not reveal a means into the wallet server.