Wut?

Mixing started here: http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/a8703c9911b84af403be436cad8bc9f3b85424e825b54ace01eaaec9ebb0d965

took 14 hours - and it's damn easy to find where i started mixing as there was only 1 address with nearly the same amount of coins in that timeframe.

Now imagine someones who earns his money with statistical analysis wastes resources to find such "evidences" ....

why not make a reasonable contribution to the thread.

perhaps can have two threads:

1. XMR vs DRK - reasonable, friendly debate

2. XMR vs DRK - mud-slinging and trolling

When you say 'take over his MN' what are you actually describing? Denial of service? Snooping Traffic? Replacing the daemon with a compromised version?

Need to understand what you actually mean and how it relates to security of the network and any information gathering.

I know you are capable of it, we had a few posts with each other, so i know you are not someone who doesn't understand things.

The thing is you arguing on a wrong assumption about darksend!

Its realy not how it works if you use darksend.

Ill try to give an example.

If you have 50 drk in addr1
after starting the darksend denomination process you have (for example):
10 drk in addr2
10 drk in addr3
10 drk in addr4
10 drk in addr5
1 drk in addr6
1 drk in addr7
1 drk in addr8
1 drk in addr9
1 drk in addr10
1 drk in addr11
1 drk in addr12
1 drk in addr13
1 drk in addr14
0.1 drk in addr15
0.1 drk in addr16
0.1 drk in addr17
0.1 drk in addr18
0.1 drk in addr19
0.1 drk in addr20
0.1 drk in addr21
0.1 drk in addr22
0.1 drk in addr23
0.1 drk in addr24

so now all these addresses contain drk which has been mixed in the process of darksend with other users who also started the darksend mixture.
So there is no direct connection between these addresses.

so now you send
20.72368 that means darksend will use your previous mixed addresses - for this it will be something like:
addr2 + addr3 + addr15 + addr16 + addr17 + addr18 + addr19 + addr20 + addr21 - this will add to 20.8 - you have to pay 20.8, the difference goes to the miners exactly for the fact wo don't want any change address! (you could have also send 20.8 instead so you wont sponsor the miners)

so now these addresses are all gone out of your pool, if you now spend the rest, there is no connection between these addresses used in the first and the ones used in the second send right now.

Ok that's the key element I was missing, that basically there are no change addresses (although if 0.1 is the minimum that means every anonymous payment you make will incur an additional cost of as much as $0.51 at present, presumably this lower bound will decrease in future).

BlockaFett: now's the time you do a little happy dance and write lots of bold text about how one of my conclusions was incorrect. You can even call it "BS" and say that I "don't understand anything" if it'll help you with your self-esteem problems:)

yes its right there could be a fee of up to 0.00999999 DRK/DASH ~ 51 cents right now.

But i don't see that as a problem, if price goes up, its no problem to adjust the lowest denomination to 0.01 or 0.001 ...

And if you do not want to "support" the network with that 51 cent miners fee, you could also adjust the amount you send, to a "denominational" amount, so you'll give it as tip to whoever you pay. (Ofc you can't do this if the reciever handles the transaction automatically and he needs the amount to be exactly what he stated)

No, there was one deanonymisation problem I posited late today which proved to be incorrect (that users can trivially and unwittingly deanonymise themselves, through change addresses, when sending successive post-mixing transactions). Thus far I believe the rest of my assertions to be correct.

I wouldn't conclude that

But i would say, yes for me thats enough anonymity, in the end everything is "exploitable" its just a question of "costs", like fluffypony said - yes you need more power then in the whole universe so for now thats not possible, but you cant know whats there in the future, and you can't know if the attacker got lucky and just needs 1 min, because he was lucky. (I hope i don't misqoute fluffypony here, but i interpret this that way.)


So you can calculate the security of your darksend by yourself with a few assumption you have to take (because you cant know) like

darksend with 50 rounds, masternode network has 2000 masternodes, and i assume for me in worst case 1500 of these are bad actors.

So i got something like:
(1500/2000)^50 = 0.000005 => its a chance of 1 : 1750000 that a bad actor (with 1500 of 2000 MN) statistically can observe my mixing.

For me thats enough secure to say its anonym. But for some it may be not enough, because they cant know if there and how many bad actors are in the net. so if all 2000 out of 2000 are bad actors, you can be sure it won't be anonym anymore. (I think thats the point im reading about MNs are not trustless, because you can't know if they save the darksend or not - but thats not my view of it)

How does that solve the issues my post mentioned?



You can just own the major amount of coinjoin-transactions to trace back what happens; no need to mess with masternodes. Combined with other statical analysis approaches this is quiet powerful?

No, I'm not sure you can compromise the MN network in any practical sense, assuming it works as designed.