This might have been answered before (if it has, I couldn't find it): can the Trezor help in the case of malware that simply modifies the destination Bitcoin address (for instance when you browse to an online shop, it silently changes the Bitcoin address that you're supposed to send funds to to one that it generates). The user then visually checks that the address displayed by the Trezor is the one that he sees on the website but he has no idea that the address belongs to the attacker.

I understand how the Trezor protects against malware trying to modify the address you're paying to by displaying it on the Trezor itself before signing, but I don't see how it can protect against the malware simply modifying the address shown on the web page. Also, given that receiving addresses are supposed to be one-shot, they will change on each payment so the user has no chance of whitelisting or visually recognizing the correct one.

A rogue Chrome extension for instance could just do a quick find/replace on the page (Bitcoin addresses are easily identifiable, not many words start with 1 and are 27-34 characters long ) and change all Bitcoin addresses to the ones of the attacker. If anyone is interested, I could probably write one as a proof of concept.

Any ideas?

Can't help but to feel a bit punished for ordering early.

Can't help but to feel a bit punished for ordering early.

Can't help but to feel a bit punished for ordering early.

Stick and Slush, why did you take a page from the BFL playbook?

At the very last minute, with no warning, you say there will be a three month delay. Then, you offer new customers a better deal than you're original supporters?