....At the same time, I would suggest that you are wrong in regards to your description of the vulnerability being ameliorated by having a stronger pin number, which I believe hardly does shit if someone has physical access to the device with a non-secure element.
....
no no JJG .... The PIN is used to encrypt the seed on your device. A strong (long) PIN cannot be cracked via brute force, so it's not possible to decrypt your seed when someone gets hold of your device.
That's why Trezor enabled PINs with 50 digit length (maybe longer), when they fixed the vulnerability of physical access a few years ago.
Means, if your PIN is long enough (has enough entropy) nobody can get the seed out of your device.
No (un)secure element needed !
I recall that the security breach of having physical access to the Trezor was from several years ago, and I thought that the ONLY remedies was avoiding physical access to the Trezor and/or having a passphrase, as is stated in
this Kraken Blog article. The Article describes brute forcing the pin too, yet I cannot recall the pin being less vulnerable based on length and complication, even though what you say makes sense if they have to brute-force the pin, too.
Until I see something more clear, I will have to take what you are saying about the creation of a more robust pin (as the solution to the problem) with a grain of salt.
haha no need to trust me.... that the PIN protects your Trezor against physical attacks by encrypting the seed is written in the adtual article you posted yourself...
We then crack the encrypted seed, which is protected by a 1-9 digit PIN, but is trivial to brute force.
https://blog.kraken.com/product/security/kraken-identifies-critical-flaw-in-trezor-hardware-walletsAgain, that's why Trezor upped the possible PIN length to 50 digits (166 Bits), so there is no possibility to brute force anymore.
If that 2020 article is proclaiming that changing the pin number protects you from attack, then
why did they not list such protection in their suggestions? Here's what the article says:
Maybe there is a newer article going into such details that describe how making a more sophisticated pin code helps? or prevents hack-ability, as you seem to want to proclaim.
...because at that time the Trezor didn't offer the possibility of a longer PIN yet
c'mon JJG it can't be that hard to understand!
You think I am playing with you?
I am not. I am giving my own understanding of the matter, and I don't claim to be a technical genius, yet I have been pointing out some technical pieces to support the assertions that I have been making...and to show my understanding of the matter. I doubt that what I have been saying is outside of the sphere of what some other guys might think about various Trezor weaknesses, and/or vulnerabilities. And, by the way, I find Trezor's usability to be quite friendly and easy.
From my understanding, frequently Trezor is still being criticized because of its physical access vulnerability, and sure that could merely be competitors who are making those kinds of proclamations, yet Trezor does not seem to be countering those claims.
If the longer pin were to be removing such physical access vulnerabilities (or greatly diminishing such vulnerabilities) then I would have had thought that there would be some kind of a counter-marketing campaign coming out of Trezor's camp and/or one of their supporting camps rather than their seeming to want to cave in and to move over towards providing secure elements in their newer products, which yeah so far many of us recognize that the secure element is not completely open sourced, so the Trezor with the secure element remains problematic.
Are you trying to suggest that the Trezor with a sophisticated pin is nearly as secure as the trezor with a secure element? or you would not go that far in your seeming proclamation that more sophisticated pins are going to save us from hackers if we do not end up locking ourselves out of the device with such sophisticated pins.. yet with Trezor we don't need to worry if we lock ourselves out of the device anyhow since we can still use the device and we can reload our back up seed words back onto the device. As far as I know, so far, the trezor does not brick itself after unsuccessful attempts with the pin as some other hardware wallet devices do.
I wonder where are JJG's Gay Christmas cards ??
seems like Christmas is over, even on that pic... try again next year
I don't recall my having any kind of meaningful streak of posting gay Christmas cards, even at the peak of the holiday card sending seasonings...
As a matter of fact, I find it less than appealing to be looking at pics of men (whether well-endowed or not), as compared with gawking at the attributes of the more fair sex.
That's part of the reason why I keep my Grinder settings aimed at having preferences for females.
It's not for you or me... it's for the BTC price ! ...ok admittedly that
is for you and me then
Perhaps I never bought into the gay christmas cards angle, even though surely
I have been participating in the all-seasons daily pushups angle...even though I don't really like doing pushups every day.
the pushup thing seems to be more widespread than I thought!
thanks for bringing us to 100k, then!
could I ask you to pls do it again?
