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    Author Topic: Has the NSA already broken bitcoin?  (Read 50540 times)
    gmaxwell
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    September 07, 2013, 06:33:13 AM
     #81

    with breaking 'any' encryption was ment the conventional encryption for files - so truecrypt for example would be useless
    FWIW, Quantum computers are not even _theorized_ to do that.  Very large true quantum computers would render some cryptosystems obsolete, if they turn out to be possible to construct— primarily the popular asymmetric (public key) schemes whos hardness is based on the intractability of the hidden subgroup problem such as discrete log and factoring hardness systems.

    QC's really don't do much of anything of interest to symmetric ciphers and hash functions, beyond suggesting that longest hashes and key lengths would be prudent (in theorygrover's algorithm gives a generic speedup on root finding over non-linear functions which is equivalent to halving the number of bits of input).  QC's should not render your truecrypt obsolete.

    Bringing this back on topic— if ginormous QC's became a realistic threat we'd need to add a new checksig operator, which is just a soft forking change which could be non-disruptively deployed. So long as you don't reuse addresses you already have a degree of protection against QC's or any $spook backdoors in SECP256k1 ECDSA, as your ecdsa public key is not revealed until the first time you spend and any attacker would have to race your transaction to steal it. The bigger issue is that the QC secure signature schemes result in rather large signatures.
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