so i just wanted to point out that there is the potential for some small amount of information to be leaked by people using very specific mixin values. for example, for 2 transactions which both used a mixin value of 23 might be surmised that its more likely than a random sample that these two transactions were initiated by the same party. standardized mixin denominations offering a range of options might be preferable. 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, ect.... (just as an example) plenty of flexability there. its unlikey that someone who wants more than 20 mixin couldnt be happy with 25 and would feel very strongly that they wanted 22 very specifically. so in this way there would be little cost to the user in inconvenience, but potentially reasonable gain to the privacy of the network for that very small inconvenience cost.
So in other words randomize the mixin count? How does a tx's mixin count get traced back to the initial or final tx?
Well its not that. Its just that an outside observer can see how many participants there are in a ring signature, that in its self leaks
some amount of information. Albeit a small amount, it could be used in combination with other analytical methods we can imagine, or perhaps ones we cant. Perhaps that small ammount of information would end up being the marginal factor allowing an attacker to deobfuscate parts of the network.
And no im not suggesting random values, though that could work too, im suggesting standardized denominations. i.e. 20 is an option and 25 is an option but 21,22,23,and24 are not options.
