Software doesn't run on intentions
Coordinators apparently do. I don't question Wasabi wallet for being bad software per se (although I do have concerns as mentioned repeatedly about address reuse etc.), I question the intentions of the developers who run the coordinator, which I must comply with if I need to use it.
So use a different coordinator or run your own:
I've read most of the posts/replies towards Kruw, and I think that everyone is making too much commotion over nothing but a trade-off taken by a group of developers, who, believes that the best path forward for Wasabi Wallet is to make the centralized coordinator block outputs from nefarious sources. The solution, in my personal opinion is, fork the coordinator and have it accept all outputs from all sources.
Yep. Anyone who feels brave enough to copy and paste the coordinator code can do so. Others have already because they actually care about what they are saying:
https://t.me/WasabiWallet/70611You make it sound as everything is transparent, while that's false. I have absolutely no manner to verify which outputs you consider inappropriate, and according to which standard.
Why does it matter if you can't verify the registration standards of the coordinator? As a maker in Joinmarket, you can't verify the standards of the coordinator either. The only thing that can happen to you if your input is considered inappropriate is it stays in the same address it started in without being linked to any of your other addresses.
Since Wasabi is a non custodial wallet, there is no way to prevent users from sending to an address twice.
But Wasabi picks addresses automatically. Is this correct?
Each client does, yes. This will obviously cause address generation collision if the same seed is used on two clients asynchronously, since the clients are not aware of the automatic activities performed by each other. This is why all critics of address reuse in Wasabi can only ever show evidence of a transaction that took place, not evidence of a bug that exists in the open source code. I happily encourage anyone to review and scrutinize the code to verify that Wasabi will not automatically reuse an address:
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabiNow that you have confirmed the answer to your question was "No", answer my original question:
Not yet. I haven't done my analysis to this. I generally don't spend hours on verifying every privacy-preserving software. I just stick with tested, peer-reviewed software, running in a decentralized fashion, and avoid pro-censorship and anti-fungibility software which is subjected to arbitrary ethic rules, and whose developers outright lie in front of me. It's a good life choice, and it has worked so far without issues.
Stop stalling. Just give me the tx id of your most private Joinmarket coinjoin.
The reason why more coordinators are not popping up, I have already asked that question here (somewhere). Apparently, you need so much initial capital to start with - for example, the ~6000 seized Chipmixer bitcoins would be enough - and most people who want to run a coordinator just don't have that kind of money.
You don't need any capital to start a coordinator, liquidity comes from the users. 50 inputs is an estimated lower bound for a WabiSabi coinjoin to provide a consistent amount of matching outputs.
Plus from everyone's personal experience, when have users truly had a problem with "taint" regularly? The forum should be full of threads complaining about it by now.
I don't think that's good enough. I don't want to have that problem even once. Especially if everything worked flawlessly until it suddenly didn't, and my coins got taken by someone who gave themselves the right to do so based on the "proof" they received by a surveillance agency whose standards and methods are unknown. The solution is to abandon centralized exchanges, but not that many people will want to hear that message.
This is completely wrong, your coins can't get "taken by someone who gave themselves the right to do so" since Coinjoins are completely non custodial.
You should know what when most people say "Wasabi is not privacy-friendly", they are actually referring to its coordinator zksnacks.
When I say that, I mean the entire project-- not just the default behavior of the wallet software. First of all, even that is questionable due to the reasons outlined in Twitter threads, o_e_l_e_o has posted.A simple example is address - bc1qjqg7znvswmgkuwpjfp0dfw57twqfkazjk3vuup - that was reused twice using Wasabi 2.0, as described in
here.
What's your point? In this example, it's even more obvious the seed was cloned to multiple devices since it participated in a Wasabi 1.0 and Wasabi 2.0 coinjoin within the same week.
Account
wasabistats from Twitter specifically does expose their flaws. Maybe our fellow contributor can help us out and explain why there's a Twitter account out there outright lying?
Probably for the same exact reason that there's Bitcointalk accounts like you and o_e_l_e_o on here outright lying: WabiSabi coinjoins are completely private and completely non custodial, which makes non private coinjoins like Whirlpool and custodial mixers that have been completely compromised (like the ones advertised in your signatures) strictly inferior. These services simply can't compete under the standard of honesty since WabiSabi coinjoins solve all the problems their services create:
https://twitter.com/Kruwed/status/1642612625883164672