I do not know how to code.
But the name coinfirm is clearly written here:

https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/blob/795496595fae2f52730e1556bb6cafd2c649bb97/WalletWasabi.Tests/UnitTests/WabiSabi/Backend/CoinVerifierTests.cs#L215

https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/blob/795496595fae2f52730e1556bb6cafd2c649bb97/WalletWasabi.Tests/UnitTests/WabiSabi/Backend/CoinVerifierTests.cs#L220

No, you can't. Makers can choose not to join your coinjoin, and so you can pick different makers instantly. They absolutely cannot ban you from coinjoining altogether like Wasabi can do. (I know you are going to repeat your nonsense soundbite about "run your own coordinator" here, but as I explained above, that simply is not an option for 99.9% of users).

This is obviously the best option, and it's never been easier. We have the biggest choice of DEXs we've ever had, we have the most volume on DEXs that we've ever had, and we have the most advanced DEX (Bisq) that we've ever had.

A very important thing that Bisq is still missing is ⚡ lightning network.

For smaller trades it is vital.

It's coming soon!

Absolutely. And nice for the CEO to spell out in the thread I linked above just exactly what Coinfirm are doing to your UTXOs you try to mix with Wasabi. Firstly they link your UTXOs with off-chain information, entities, identities, etc. Then they cluster your UTXO with others belonging to you, examine your transactions in order to identify patterns which can be used to link to your other transactions, look for anomalies, graph analysis, throw in some machine learning and AI as well. That's exactly what I want to happen every time I try to coinjoin!

But of course, the specifics of their techniques remain completely secret and they can refuse your coins for any reason and not tell you why. Super transparent!

Samourai isn't perfect, but I would readily recommend it over Wasabi. If you do use Samourai, then it's important to enable Tor and link it to your own node to maintain full privacy.

For desktop, then the easiest option is to use Sparrow (also with Tor and your own node) to mix with Samourai's Whirlpool. The best, but more complex, option is to run JoinMarket.

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

You really are a broken record.

I refer you to my previous replies:

Also, nice of you to disappear for two months after I made the following post.

There is nothing stopping users combining UTXOs outside of a Wasabi coinjoin which compromises their privacy,

just as there is nothing stopping them doing that with a Samourai coinjoin as has happened here

In every case, such behavior is not a flaw in the coinjoin protocol.

What is a flaw in the coinjoin protocol is when the coinjoin protocol itself actively reuses addresses, as I've linked to Wasabi doing multiple times.

Lmao. "My drama". It is very much Wasabi's drama, and deeply unethical behavior.

If a user funds their Samourai wallet, then Samourai creates a Tx0 to segregated unmixed change. If the user chooses to then combine a coinjoin output with that unmixed change, then there is nothing the coinjoin protocol can do to stop them.

If a user funds their Wasabi wallet, the transaction which funds that wallet will create unmixed change. If the user chooses to then combine a (surveilled and permissioned) coinjoin output with that unmixed change, then there is nothing the coinjoin protocol can do to stop them.

If a user swaps some coins to monero, the transaction which funded that swap will create unmixed change. If the user then swaps some monero back to bitcoin and combines that new bitcoin with the unmixed change, then there is nothing monero can do to stop them.

Every privacy service or protocol in existence has the same weakness of a user combining unmixed changed with mixed outputs. That is not the fault of the privacy service or protocol, but the fault of the user.

On the other hand, the flaws in Wasabi such as constant address reuse

Nope, I wasn't referring to sock puppeting at all. I was referring to Wasabi actively doxxing people who disagree with them. That's the behavior of real privacy loving cypherpunks.

I really don't know how to make this any simpler for you to grasp. I'll try.

I have a UTXO of 0.5 BTC.

I make a transaction sending 0.2 BTC to Wasabi, and 0.3 BTC to a change address.

After Wasabi have thoroughly spied on the 0.2 BTC I sent and received permission from their blockchain analysis buddies and their government sanctioned blacklists, I am hopefully granted permission to coinjoin it. Ignoring Wasabi fees and transaction fees for the sake of simplicity, I now have a coinjoined output of 0.2 BTC.

I then combine this 0.2 BTC output with my original 0.3 BTC in the change address.

There is nothing Wasabi, or Samourai, or JoinMarket, or anyone else for that matter, can do to stop me from doing this. Samourai give the transaction a specific name and segregate the change in to a different account to help prevent the user from making this error, but there is nothing they can do to stop it entirely. Wasabi also cannot stop it, but apparently Wasabi contributors choose just to ignore it and pretend it cannot happen instead since they don't actually care about their users' privacy in the first place.

Lmfao. So everyone in the world is storing all their coins on Wasabi all the time? No one ever sends a transaction to their Wasabi wallet which has a change output?

Now I'm certain you are just trolling.

You yourself linked to Samourai's disclosure and fixes, which were implemented years ago. Meanwhile Wasabi just deny their address reuse and dox anyone who talks about it.

What is a flaw in the coinjoin protocol is when the coinjoin protocol itself actively reuses addresses

Here are some possible scenarios:

- I want to test Wasabi Wallet, and I'm required to send a small amount which can come back to my main wallet software.
- I want to mix less than 0.5 BTC, and I only possess an 0.5 BTC UTXO.
- I may don't like Wasabi Wallet as wallet software, and I only want to use it to coinjoin, which means I have to occasionally move coins from Wasabi to my main wallet software.

It's quite possible, and it is the user's fault. What the user does outside the wallet software isn't the wallet software's fault.