and you're just being a shill again trying to discredit anyone who is asking good questions.

what does Satoshi have to do with what i would believe to be an expected disclaimer warning to moving one's BTC to a SC?

no, what's happening is you don't understand the tech.

presumably, these scBTC if pegged 1:1 and properly implemented would have a market price closely correlated to BTC's from the jump. the price of BTC units on a sidechain is not dependent on whether the innovation is working or not

i do understand the tech.  it's you who do not understand the economics. 

it's perfectly reasonable to expect the price to differ in certain circumstances even in the presence of arbitrage.

Could be a discount or a premium depending on market supply and demand factors. Long term, yes you would expect a discount given the weaker security.

I think there is. Altcoins get criticized constantly for not warning people enough about the risks involved, and therefore contributing to people losing money. Bitcoin developers should not get a pass on doing the exact same thing.

In my opinion sidechains (by which I mean locks that are contingent on actions of another chain) are a valuable extension of the Bitcoin functionality but they are also being hyped.

I am of the belief they will be but that fact doesn't stop consumers falling victim to deceit, given 99% of the people (pole stats reviewed @ 55 second into the clip)  who will adopt Bitcoin are unaware of the mechanism of inflation and how increasing the supply robs them of value, I don't see this ending well for Bitcoin.

Speaking of economics (or, more fundamentally, system analysis), one of the biggest issues of sidechains that I see has to do with the latency in exercising the two-way peg.

Sidechains can be assumed to be fairly small in total value relative to the total in BTC.  The distribution of wealth in Bitcoin means that there are plenty of whales.  If (or when) these folks decide to game things, they might be able to get some interesting oscillations riding on on the various sidechain pegs going.

In order to defend itself a sidechain is going to need to be able to anticipate these potentially significant threats and figure out buffering mechanism to isolate themselves.  Those who fail to do so in a proactive manner, or who implement ineffective protections, may be under very unwelcome influences.

The relatively high latency(theorized) of the two-way pegs may act as a natural buffer or be able to be leveraged as such.  One way or another I'll be paying some attention to how well the designers of a given sidechain have thought about this nature of attack mode.

and you may not have the luxury of a practical example.

for instance, one of the first SC's i'd expect to pop up is a SC with perfect anonymity added as an innovation to a simple fork of Bitcoin with no initial coins and a 1:1 peg in place to accept incoming transfers of BTC to scBTC.

the question for you is, what if you saw significant #'s of BTC start moving into scBTC, what would you conclude?

Lets say we have a 1:1 sidecoin with properties that is good for microtransactions. To simplify, first consider the sidechain to be a company, where customers are the news suppliers, who should receive the money, and the readers, who should pay the money. In this first model, the company must be trusted. A reader sends amount-a to an address addr-a controlled by the company. We call it tx-a. Microtransactions ensue with multiple customers, and at some later time, the company sends addr-a containing amount-a to a new address controlled by the receiving news source.

The bitcoin protocol is ok with this, as long as all transactions are valid.

Now we enhance the example, where the company is replaced by the sidechain. The sidechain logic must create a receiving bitcoin address where the unlocking key is known by noone, and at the same time create a sidecoin address where the unlocking key is given to the news reader in the example. Microtransactions ensue, and after a while a news producer has the amount-a in the form of sxBTC. He then wants to destroy the scBTC and  receive his BTC. Let's just say it is a corresponding amount, it makes the example easier.

The problem of the sidechain logic is now to construct the hidden unlocking key of the output address addr-a of tx-a or another tx with the same amount. A new bitcoin transaction is created with address-a as input, and with a news-producer address as output. So seen from the bitcoin blockchain point of view, this is only two normal transactions. It has to be so, because bitcoin can not contain rules to validate transactions in the sidechain, that would be the same as extending the bitcoin protocol with the sidechain funtionality.

Is it possible to hide the bitcoin unlocking key in the sidechain like this? That is the question.