Don't rightly know.  There have been a variety of crises under fiat regimes.  The nature of the crisis and other aspects of the state under observation limit the usefulness of comparisons.  Looking around a bit, I don't see this exact detail in most of the more trivial descriptions of one crisis or another.

Here's something of interest (no pun intended) that I just dug up concerning Argentina.  It seems to be a policy such as I anticipated would likely play out here in the US...at least in the fat middle of the potential failure scenarios.

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https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CEcQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.areuea.org%2Fconferences%2Fpdf%2Fpapers%2Fareuea%2520website%2FSumit%2520Agarwal.pdf&ei=-mDqULWbILHyigLHhYD4Bw&usg=AFQjCNGDChwojdYlo1CWHjxM7LyihTtDlQ&bvm=bv.1355534169,d.cGE
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...
As a result, the pesofication was applied asymmetrically at parity for loans to the private
sector, but at the official exchange rate –although already out of touch with the market
rate- for the other contracts, in particular for deposits. Furthermore, outstanding bonds of
public or private Argentinean entities issued under Argentine law were also pesofied.8

To alleviate the impact of the pesofication on the financial assets of creditors,
indexation was introduced. Initially, the “Coeficiente de Estabilización Financiera”
(CER) index used was based on the Consumer Price Index, and in the case of consumer
loans (including mortgages) included a 3.5% per annum (in real terms) cap on the interest
rate to be applied. This index severely impaired debtors because of the price surge
following the devaluation of the Peso. Subsequently, it was replaced in October 2002, for
...
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