IadixDev
Full Member
Activity: 322
Merit: 151
They're tactical
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August 08, 2017, 10:24:24 AM
Last edit: August 08, 2017, 12:47:23 PM by IadixDev |
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well dude i gotta congratulate you after you posted this pile of convoluted philosophical rubbish. I read it like 3 times and conclude its just a big pile of meaningless Alan D Sokal bullshit designed to sound like you are saying something but its all nonsensical big long words/phrases strung together to be grammatically correct that is gibberish and says nothing. well done my friend! here ya go-----> http://www.physics.nyu.edu/sokal/weinberg.htmlPoor BADecker...my favorite trolling buddy! he apparently stopped posting after this.... he probably couldn't figure out wtf you were on about (what a surprise) and got scared away! lol It's very interesting dissertation based on riemann habilitation dissertation  Its sense is very clear lol Read it more time, or watch the video I posted after, it's not giberish, are you familiar with riemann ? Riemann is one of greatest mathematician of all times If you understand the implication of Riemann on euclidian logic, mixed with liebniz view of optimal universe based on reason, it has very deep meaning. Another version https://networkologies.wordpress.com/2009/12/27/manifoldness-spacetime-as-hypernetwork-with-leibniz-whitehead-and-riemann/networkologies Online Home of Christopher Vitale, Associate Professor of Media Studies, The Graduate Program in Media Studies, Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, NY What might it mean to look at space and time as networks? Historically, a networkological approach to time and space naturally finds one of its forefathers in Leibniz, but first its worth getting a sense of what he is reacting against. The early modern period is one of enormous flux as far as theories of space are concerned, both in terms of the establishment of space as a metric, measurable, and absolute domain (primarilly via Descartes invention of analytic/coordinate geometry), but also in terms of the parallel and complementary notion that this metrically determined sense of space and time governs the realm of things (res extensa, radically distinct from the non-metric realm of res cogitans). The Cartesian mind-body split and the notion of space (and with it the moving metric of time) as a metric is indissociable from the assumptions which make the Newtonian spatial project possible a distinct observer, the progress of a spatialized, linear, uni-directional time, etc. This tradition, which starts with Descartes, is further formalized by Netwon, reaches its apotheosis in Kant, and is based upon a split of the world into subjective and objective, one which continues to haunt the pretensions to objectivity in much of contemporary empirical science.
In contrast, the counter-tradition which Leibniz represents does not separate mind and body in the radical sense pursued by the Cartesians. For Leibniz, mind and matter are, to use a term employed by Deleuze, enfolded in each other, two sides of the same great origami-like structure we call existence. Furthermore, perception is not something limited to rational beings all parts of the universe, due to their possession of a perspective on the universe, present an opening onto the entirety of all that exists, in both space and time, in nuce, so to speak, that is, in miniature. For in fact, were not all space and time the way it is, any given spacetime location or entity wouldnt be what it is either. The whole is present, virtually and differently, in the parts.This is something which he builds up from a Leibnizian approach to the cosmos, and which also provides a foundation for the often maligned mereological aspects of the penultimate sections of Process and Reality. These sections, in which he shows the manner in which points, lines, and planes are in fact abstractions from the more complex entities we see in the world, works to show how the very notions of geometry, which many view as primary and foundational to any approach to spacetime, are in fact abstract derivatives thereof. This section, almost inpenetrable without having read Whiteheads works leading up to Process and Reality (such as On the Concept of Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Conditions of Natural Knowledge), are a reworking of his notion, developed in these earlier works, of what he calls extensive abstraction. Here we see his argument, sketched in much clearer terms, that the mathematical models of space and time that we inherit from Newton and Descartes are in fact convenient and socially useful abstractions from the primary way in which we experience the world, which is that of moving, flexible, continually reconfiguring spacetime. And in fact, we all know this anyway we often say things, when driving a car, for example, such as oh, I need to make a left in like 5 minutes. Space and time are naturally cojoined, and it is the abstractions of our modes of knowledge that separate them, leading to a situation which then needs to be overcome if we are to understand existence a bit more clearly.
While working to dissolve the distinctions between space and time, Leibniz and Whitehead also dissolve the related boundaries between mind and matter within an ontology that knows only events. If mind and matter are not fully separate, but rather two aspects of the same thing (namely, events), then the need to firmly separate the objective world of rigid, geometrical extension from the subjective world of potentially erring impressions, ceases to be a pressing matter for the establishment of scientific enquiry. And we have seen this with the rise of the subjective seeming elements in quantum physics and relativity. What matters is not what really happens to some impossible objective observer, but rather, what appears to happen from the perspective of the observer in question. And rather than these appearances be deemed less real, in line with a Newtonian/Cartesian approach to the world, rather, all these appearances are equally real. This is precisely why Bergson, another descendent of Leibniz, refers to all that exists as an image the universe has many images of events, each themselves events, none of which are more or less real than others.But this creates some difficulties, for how can we describe the unfolding of this change, if the order of events that which is usually used to tell time is itself no longer stable? Whiteheads term to describe change is thus not linked to time (which for him presupposes perspective and its limitations), but rather, what he calls the creative advance of the universe. This advance is the sum totals of the changes and/in the times of the events of which the universe is composed. Such a notion spatializes time as much as it temporalizes space, while providing a spur to the thought of change beyond standard conceptions of space and time.
This becomes a bit clearer by getting a sense of what is really at stake, mathematically, with the notion of spacetime. The events of which the creatively advancing manifold is composed are thus times as much as spaces, in that the only distinction between time and space is, if we are being mathematical, nothing more than the speed of light squared. That is, space takes a certain amount of time to cross at this top speed, while time going at top speed indicates a certain amount of space. Time and space are strictly convertible, at least numerically, with only a minus sign and a conversion factor, a multiplier, between the numbers that describe one, and those that describe another. But does that mean they are two different ways of describing the same thing?This one also super cool ! http://wlym.com/antidummies/part59.html
Riemann for Anti-Dummies Part 59
Think Infinitesimal by Bruce Director
"It is well known that scientific physics has existed only since the invention of the differential calculus," stated Bernhard Riemann in his introduction to his late 1854 lecture series posthumously published under the title, "Partial Differential Equations and their Applications to Physical Questions". For most of his listeners, Riemann's statement would have been fairly straight forward, for they understood the physical significance of Leibniz's calculus as it had percolated over the preceding sesquicentury through the work of Kaestner and Gauss. A far different condition exists, however, for most of today's readers, whose education has been dominated by the empiricism of the Leibniz-hating Euler, Cauchy and Russell. While such victims might find the formal content of Riemann's statement agreeable, its true intention would be as obscure to them as the Gospel of John and Epistles of Paul are to Karl Rove and his legions of true believers.
The empiricist will not understand Riemann's statement, for the simple reason that what he associates with the words "differential calculus" is a completely different idea than what Riemann and Leibniz had in mind. To the victim of today's empiricist-dominated educational system, the infinitesimal calculus concerns only a set of rules for mathematical formalism. But to the scientist, the infinitesimal calculus is a kind of Socratic dialogue, through which man transcends the limitations of sense-perception and discovers those universal principles that govern all physical action.
The empiricist rejects Leibniz's notion, because he accepts Aristotle's doctrine that "physics concerns only objects of sense", whereas Plato, Cusa, Leibniz and Riemann emphasized, physics concerns objects of {thought}. These thought-objects, or "Geistesmassen" as Riemann called them, refer to the universal principles which {cause} the objects of sense to behave the way they are perceived to behave. Not being directly accessible to the senses, such principles appear to come from "outside" the visible world. However, a great mistake is made if one concludes from this, as the sophists do, that these principles come from outside the universe itself. In fact, these principles, being universal, are acting everywhere, at all times, and in every "infinitesimal" interval of action, osculating the objects of sense as if tangent to the visible domain.
It is this relationship between the observed motions of the objects of sense, and the universal principles acting everywhere on them, that Leibniz's differential calculus is designed to express. Through it, a universal principle, as it is seen and unseen, is enfolded into a single thought, showing us what is known, and indicating to us what is yet to be discovered. A scientist who turns away, under Aristotle's, Sarpi's, or Russell's, influence, from these objects of thought, to objects of mere sense, is acting as if his own mind has ceased to exist, which, in fact, it has.
Just as Riemann correctly asserts, that scientific physics began with the invention of the differential calculus, it can be justly stated that the differential calculus began with Cusa's excommunication of Aristotle from science. While it is true that some of the methods of Leibniz's calculus were beginning to develop in the work of Archytas and Archimedes, this development was arrested when Aristotle's doctrines became hegemonic in European culture, following the murder of Archimedes by the Romans. Cusa reversed this disaster and reoriented European science away from its obsession with objects of sense, and back to the Pythagorean/Socratic focus on the idea.
Cusa insisted that perception is not caused by sensible things, but that things are sensible because the mind has the power to sense. In turn, the mind is able to sense, because it possesses a still higher faculty of rationality; and it is able to rationalize because it possesses a still higher faculty of intellect; and it is able to intellectualize because man is created in the infinitesimal image of God.
That the cognitive capacity of the mind was the real target of the oligarchy's attack on Leibniz's calculus, was confessed to a popular audience by Richard Courant and Herbert Robbins in their English language 1941 book, {What is Mathematics}:
"...the very foundations of the calculus were long obscured by an unwillingness to recognize the exclusive right of the limit concept as the source of the new methods. Neither Newton nor Leibniz coudl bring himself to such a clear-cut attitude, simple as it appears to us now that the limit concept has been completely clarified. Their example dominated more than a century of mathematical development during which the subject was shrouded by talk of `infinitely small quantities', `differentials',`ultimate ratios' etc. {the reluctance with which these concepts were finally abandoned was deeply rooted in the philosophical attitude of the time and in the very nature of the human mind}" (emphasis added, poor punctuation in the original bmd.).
The empiricist sees objects in motion and imagines them to move in a space that is as empty as he believes his own mind to be. A scientist envisions a manifold of universal physical principles, embodied as animated objects of thought that enliven the objects before his eyes. To the former, change is an annoying inconvenience that disrupts his ultimately futile attempts to maintain his accepted axiomatic-formal structure. To the latter, change is the happy indicator of the moving effect of universal principles acting, universally, yet differently, at all infinitesimal intervals of time and space.
http://lymcanada.org/riemman-for-anti-dummies/This is real science  If that doesnt prove many of the key point about fundementals of god existence as portrayed in new testament, I dont know what will lol I dont know why baddecker doesnt post anymore, maybe he is banned, maybe he realized newton is bull crap, that his c&e theory based on thermodynamics is illusion, and he is investigation the real maths with Leibniz and riemann more in tune with god belief Newton is at best bogus metaphysics. Descartes as long as he stay in philosophy he is ok, but his whole system of mechanics based on separation of mind and matter with pineal gland & all is beyond bogus. Riemann is still the best so far but relativity totally discard the Leibniz part which is too bad, need some new form of geometry and math and conception of space to accomodate all fields of science. |
